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Abstract: The Northeast Arctic cod (NEA cod) ﬁsheries in Norway are now one 
of the richest cod ﬁsheries in the world. In the past the ﬁshery has experienced 
several stock declines and low economic returns. In this paper we review manage-
ment approaches applied over 20 years to address one of the most severe crises in 
the ﬁshery. Emphasis is on management strategies and the measures carried out 
to ensure successful rebuilding of the ﬁshery, both biologically and economically. 
Though the rebuilding of the Northeast Arctic cod ﬁsheries has in many ways 
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been a success, a multitude of issues connected to social and economic conse-
quences still remain. The lessons learned from this study relate to management, 
legitimacy, and economic issues, and may be relevant to other struggling ﬁsheries.
Key words: Northeast Arctic cod (NEA cod); Fisheries Management, rebuilding 
fishery
1. Introduction1
The Northeast Arctic (NEA) cod stock is the largest in the world, and currently in 
very good condition. NEA cod are highly migratory fish, grazing in the Barents 
Sea and spawning along the Norwegian coast. From January to April each year 
they accumulate in particular around the Lofoten islands, and since the Viking 
Age this spawning fishery has been important both for the region and for Norway 
as a whole as a source of food and export income. The cod stock moves across na-
tional boundaries between Norway and Russia, who together, based on biological 
advice, determine total allowable catches and their respective share, as well as 
those of third countries.2
The Norwegian share of the fishery has been managed using a number of input 
controls, such as limiting gear type, mesh size, and number of vessels. Trawlers 
were first made to adhere to a total quota in 1978, while coastal vessels operated 
relatively freely until 1989, when the fishery was halted in April due to an estimated 
stock decline. Since then coastal vessels too have been limited to individual and 
group quotas. Some transferability of quotas was also introduced.3 Post-1990 the 
NEA cod stock and harvests increased rapidly, but combined with low individual 
fish growth and a rise in cannibalism, yet another decline occurred towards the end 
of the 90s. This triggered new management approaches for rebuilding the fishery.4
Like many other fish stocks, the NEA cod stock has fluctuated with prolonged 
periods of stock decline (see Figure 1). A recent study shows that more than half 
the fisheries around the world are in decline, and that the stocks are in worse con-
dition than previously thought. But the study also shows that strong management 
1. This paper is based on an earlier report carried out for OECD. The authors thank Ingrid 
Pettersen and Marius Berntsen for assistance with data, Bjørn Hersoug and Svein Jentoft for 
inputs on lessons learned, and Guri Hjallen Eriksen, Sverre Johansen and Vidar Landmark 
for valuable comments on an earlier version. Two anonymous reviewers are also thanked for 
useful comments. Any errors or omissions remain the responsibility of the authors.
2. Armstrong and Flaaten 1991: 137; Eide et al. 2012.
3. Armstrong and Clark 1997: 206; Hersoug 2005.
4. For presentation of these management approaches, see Nakken et al. 1996; Sandberg et al. 1998.
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can prevent further decline, and in some cases get the stocks growing again5. The 
management of NEA cod seemingly has been successful, though presumably aided 
by favorable environmental conditions, resulting in cod spawning stock biomass 
(SSB) now at a record high, and the total stock biomass being close to the highest 
observed since scientists started studying the stock some 100 years ago (see Figure 
1).6 Furthermore, although the large total allowable catch (TAC) may have pushed 
market prices in a downwards direction, there is substantial optimism surround-
ing the fishery, reflected in both income and quota acquisitions.
Total biomass SBB
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Figure 1: Total biomass (1946–2011) and spawning stock biomass (SSB) (1946–2012) of 
Northeast Arctic cod in the Barents Sea.7
Clearly there is much to be learned reviewing the case of the NEA cod fisheries. In 
this paper we take a closer look at NEA cod management and examine the strategy 
employed to rebuild the fishery. We investigate the social and economic consequen-
ces of rebuilding the fishery, and identify some of the lessons learned in the process.
5. Costello et al. 2012.
6. ICES 2012a.
7. Data from ICES 2012b.
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2. Background
The Northeast Arctic cod (Gadus morhua) fishery is one of the most important 
fisheries in Norway, and is operated in the Norwegian and the Barents Seas, in-
cluding both offshore and coastal fleet segments. The cod stock migrates between 
Norwegian, Russian and international waters in its life cycle (see Figure 2), and is 
managed jointly by Russia and Norway in the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries 
Commission (JNRFC).
Figure 2: The distribution of the NEA cod stock8
The first rebuilding of the cod fisheries in the early 1990s started before the in-
troduction of management plans and precautionary reference points, which are 
the mainstay of today’s fisheries management. Hence the early 1990s rebuilding 
8.  Source; The Institute of Marine Research, Bergen, Norway.
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of the fishery was largely an incremental management learning process aimed at 
aligning efforts to better fit with the decline in total allowable catch (TAC). On the 
biological side, spawning stock biomass (SSB) was the focus. This is not to say that 
the lack of more modern management plans was the reason for the second stock 
decline in the mid-1990s. The decline in prey species such as capelin due to the 
increase in the herring stock is presumed to have been the main cause.
The most important threat to the rebuilding of the fishery as first assessed in the 
early 1990s was the lack of control of excessive conventional gear fishing, combined 
with insecurity around profitability in the fishery. One focus area of fisheries man-
agement was to put into place a scheme that ensured a dynamic effort adjustment 
via the introduction of conditionally transferable quota rights in the trawl fleet, and 
combined with buy-outs allocating individual quotas to the most active segment of 
the coastal fleet. Currently different segments of the fleet operate under a variety 
of quota restrictions, consisting of non-transferable and conditionally transferable 
quotas, i.e. transferability dependent upon vessel type and size, geography, and 
fishery, as well as group quotas. The fishery is also restricted by minimum fish and 
mesh size, by-catch and area restrictions, as well as a discard ban.
In the second rebuilding phase, starting at the end of the 1990s, the focus has 
been on increasing the NEA cod stock, and thereby securing stable long-term 
harvests by introducing a number of different management plans. The focus has 
been on securing a precautionary level of fishing mortality and spawning stock 
biomass, the latter at a level of 460,000 tons.
By-catch of juvenile cod in other fisheries, as well as illegal, unregulated and 
uncontrolled (IUU) fishing have been recognized as serious threats to the NEA cod 
stock. Regarding the former, area closures have been implemented in several fish-
eries when the number of juvenile fish in catches exceeds a certain limit. Sorting 
grids are also required. IUU fishing has been estimated to exceed 100,000 tons 
some years,9 and here policies have been implemented to remedy this problem, as 
described further below. Environmental conditions and the availability of prey 
also play an important role for the strength of the NEA cod stock.
The upholding of viable coastal communities along the Norwegian coastline 
is also a stated socio-political aim.10 Norwegian fisheries management has also 
accepted management options in recognition of the needs of the people of North-
West Russia,11 i.e. the rebuilding of the NEA cod fisheries is a collaborative effort 
based on a multitude of different goals.
9. ICES 2012a: 7.
10. Flaaten and Heen 2004: 451.
11. JNRFC 1999: 2.
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Furthermore, the transferability of quota rights has been more broadly intro-
duced in the fishing fleet, as a response to the political aim of increased resource 
rent. The objective of the restructuring of the fishing fleet is therefore to secure eco-
nomic viability while maintaining a diverse fleet structure. The focus on limiting 
effort, mainly through the number of fishing permits and hull length, combined 
with technological development and viable alternative employment possibilities, 
has resulted in declines in the number of fishing vessels (see Figure 3) and fish-
ers (see Figure 4). In Figure 3 we observe that both the number of large and small 
fishing vessels has been heavily reduced over the last ten years, with vessels greater 
than 15m declining by 33 % and vessels smaller than 15m declining by 52 %. As 
seen in Figure 4, the number of fishers has declined relatively less than the number 
of vessels, but there has nonetheless been a more than 60 % decline in the num-
ber of part-time fishers in the last 20 years, while the number of full-time fishers 
is more than halved. Though unemployment in Norway is low (2–7 % the last 20 
years), and alternative work has been available for fishers on a national level, there 
may be more marked limitations in small coastal communities.
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Figure 3: Number of ﬁshing vessels in Norway, larger and smaller than 15 metres, from 
2000 to 201112
12. Data from Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 2012a.
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Figure 4: Norwegian ﬁshers with ﬁshing as the main occupation and with ﬁshing as 
a secondary occupation, 1989–201113
Since 1980 the average operating margin (or earnings before interest and tax in 
percent of total revenue) in the Norwegian demersal fisheries has fluctuated be-
tween –0.6 and 12.8 %, with an average of about 6 % (see Figure 8). On average, 
negative operating margins are only found in the years 1989 and 2003, the former 
year when the coastal fishery was abruptly halted in April, and the latter marked by 
a substantial price decline, illustrating that the profitability of the fishery depends 
both on the state of the ecosystem and the market situation.
The rebuilding of the NEA cod fisheries has involved both international col-
laboration with Russia, as well as national cooperation between government, re-
searchers and fisheries interests, as will be presented in the following.14
3. Management
Since 1975 the NEA cod stock has been managed collaboratively by Norway 
and Russia (then the Soviet Union) in the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries 
Commission (JNRFC). Here the total allowable catch (TAC) of shared stocks as 
well as shares to each party and third countries are determined. Since 2004 the 
annual NEA cod TAC has been determined by the agreed Harvest Control Rules 
(HCRs) as presented later.
13. Data from Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 2012b.
14. Eide et al. 2012.
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In Norway fisheries are restricted by the Act relating to the Management of Wild 
Living Marine Resources (Havressursloven) of 2008 (and predecessors), and the 
Act relating to the Regulation of Participation in Fisheries (Deltagerloven) of 1999 
(and predecessors). The former regulates all marine harvesting in order to secure 
sustainable and profitable utilization of living marine resources, while at the same 
time securing coastal settlement and employment. The latter law regulates access 
to commercial fishing activities, aiming to restrict fishing capacity to the avail-
able resources. In special cases of threatened or endangered marine species, the 
Nature Diversity Act comes into play setting out requirements for the protection 
and implementation of recovery strategies.
The Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs is responsible for the management 
of living marine resources. The Fisheries Directorate is the advisory and execu-
tive body under the Ministry. Monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement 
are carried out by the Coast Guard, the Directorate of Fisheries, and the sales 
organizations.
There are several ways that stakeholders participate in the management of fish-
eries in Norway. The institution of consultation via public hearing is central in 
Norwegian policy-making in general. The importance of securing legitimacy and 
compliance regarding management requires even closer ties to stakeholders, and 
policy suggestions from industry organizations are not uncommonly incorporated 
directly or alternatively with some revision into the management. This encour-
ages constructive policy suggestions from stakeholders.15 Collaboration through 
research is also common, e.g. in the development of fishing gear with lower en-
vironmental cost, such as the sorting grid for trawls. The Advisory Meeting for 
Fisheries Regulations is a biannual public meeting where fishermen’s associations, 
industry organizations, trade unions, the Sami Parliament, local authorities, and 
environmental organizations as well as other stakeholders may participate and 
express their opinions.
In 1989, the initial response to the crisis was to work towards ensuring that 
the capacity of the fleet was better suited to the available fish resources. This was 
done by asserting the TAC, limiting access, decommissioning, reducing subsidies, 
implementing individual vessel quotas (IVQs) in the coastal fleet, group quotas, 
and conditionally transferable rights. Even prior to 1989 there were relatively strict 
access limitations through licensing and vessel quotas in the trawler fleet. On the 
biological side, it is important to note that cod are predatory and flourish accord-
ing to availability of prey fish and ecosystem health. So a broader multispecies 
approach to managing fisheries was implemented, as the joint Norwegian-Russian 
15. Anon 2010a: 15.
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management of the capelin stock became a function of predation by cod stock. 
Hence capelin harvest was only allowed once the expected capelin spawning stock 
had exceeded a certain level necessary to reproduce well. The capelin stock should 
first serve as prey for the more valuable cod before being harvested for its own 
lower market value. Management alternatives were based on reference points re-
lated to different fishing mortality (F) rates, which later were used as the basis for 
the new precautionary values.16
4. Restructuring the fishing fleet
Since the 1989 crisis a number of institutional changes have taken place. It was 
known even in the early 1980s that subsidies were negatively impacting the fishery 
by exacerbating already high effort levels. The phasing out of a number of diffe-
rent subsidy mechanisms reduced subsidies to Norwegian fisheries by more than 
80 % from 1991 to 1996.17
In political terms the coastal fleet is considered the backbone of the Norwegian 
fishery. Trawl fleet owners were apprehensive that capacity reducing measures 
leading to increased efficiency in the trawl fleet would result in political pressure 
to transfer quota from trawlers to coastal vessels. In order to reduce the number 
of trawler vessels, owners required security that their harvest share would remain 
unchanged. The Norwegian Fishermen’s Association therefore recommended the 
so-called Trawl Ladder, which determined the relative share to both trawler and 
coastal vessel groups, dependent on the size of the TAC. This sharing system was 
implemented by the Ministry of Fisheries in 1990 and functions in a revised ver-
sion today.18
Decommissioning has been applied in Norwegian fisheries since the 1960s, in 
some cases combined with financial aid for vessel renewal. The results of decom-
missioning are mixed; though the reduction in some vessel groups has been advan-
tageous, leading to higher vessel quotas and an improved economic situation, the 
total capacity of the fleet has not been reduced, i.e. the reduction in vessel numbers 
has not been able to compete with technological development.19
From 2003 to 2008 a decommissioning tax on all harvests was implemented in 
order to contribute to the funding of decommissioning of coastal vessels under 
15m. Overall the industry funded just over 50 % of the decommissioning. This 
16. Bogstad and Gjøsæter 1994.
17. Flaaten and Isaksen 1998.
18. Armstrong 1999: 79.
19. Anon 2007: 76.
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lead to an approximately 15 % reduction in the number of vessels under 15m in 
the time period 2003 to 2009, taking out a total of just over 400 vessels.20
In 1990, individual vessel quotas (IVQs) were implemented for the first time 
for NEA cod fished by coastal vessels, as proposed by the Norwegian Fishermen’s 
Association. The IVQs were handed out gratis by the Ministry of Fisheries and 
Coastal Affairs, and varied dependent on vessel size. In order to obtain an IVQ the 
individual vessel had to fulfill certain requirements as regards historical catch.21 
Those that did not fulfill these requirements were allowed to harvest in an open 
group. Participation in the closed coastal vessel group was and still is limited by 
annual permits in combination with IVQs, the basic quota of the vessel. The trawler 
fleet is limited by licenses. The Norwegian share of the TAC is allocated to different 
vessel groups, whereupon quotas are distributed between vessels holding the neces-
sary licenses for participation in the groups. The authorities can withdraw permits 
and licenses if required conditions are not met, and new licenses and permits can 
be allocated. Licenses and annual permits are issued to vessels, and follow the 
vessel when traded, if authorities give permission for this – and they usually do.
Since 1990 there have been various schemes in place allowing the trawler fleet 
to take vessels out of the fishery and transfer their NEA cod quota rights for a 
given number of years,22 i.e. a form of transferability was introduced. In 2005 these 
transfers were made permanent, before they again were made time restricted in 
2007, resulting in the quotas returning to the common pool of quota after a certain 
number of years. In 2003 coastal vessels over 15m, and in 2007 also vessels down to 
11m, were allowed to collect basic quota from two or three vessels onto one vessel. 
These transferred quotas were made time limited from 2007. An assessment carried 
out in 2009 by the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs finds the transferable 
rights system to be more effective than decommissioning with regards to the aims 
of adjusting the size of the fishing fleet to the available resources and improving 
the economic situation of the remaining vessels.23
A number of safeguards or restrictions in transferability of quotas were imple-
mented in order to secure political acceptability and management goals connected 
to the fisheries, such as broad coastal settlement and a diversified fleet. Deduction 
of quota when transferring between vessels, as well as no transferability between 
vessel groups are mechanisms put in place to secure the above. There are also 
limitations with regards to transferability between regions.24
20. Anon 2009a.
21. Armstrong and Clark 1997: 207; Hersoug 2005.
22. Anon 2007.
23. Anon 2009a: 21.
24. Hersoug 2005.
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5. Rebuilding the stock
The efforts to rebuild the Norwegian cod fisheries are highly dependent on the 
stock management collaboration with Russia in the JNRFC. In 1997 the JNRFC 
agreed that the NEA cod SSB precautionary level should be 500,000 tons, as sug-
gested by the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES), and 
the fishing mortality in the following years was to be reduced to under Fmed=0.46. 
In 1999 the JNRFC reiterate this aim for the SSB, but change the fishing mortal-
ity goal to Fpa=0.42 (later adjusted to 0.40). No specific timeframe was set for the 
reaching of these goals. The same year Norway stated in the protocol that NEA 
cod quota was set too high relative to the advice from ICES, but chose to take into 
account the difficult situation of the people of North-West Russia and therefore 
accepted a higher level of fishing mortality.25
The decline in the NEA cod stock in the mid-1990s was also believed to be a 
function of prey and predator availability (Hamre 1994; 2003), and this lead to 
increasing realization that fisheries cannot be managed in a single stock perspec-
tive. Biological models were developed to include the central species in the Barents 
Sea, such as cod, herring and capelin. Stock assessments of e.g. capelin, a key prey 
species for cod, are carried out taking into account the consumption by cod. Hence 
TACs for capelin are dependent upon the prior and expected cod consumption.26 In 
2003 the JNRFC agreed to a management strategy where TACs for capelin should 
ensure a capelin SSB of at least 200,000 tons with a 95 % probability.27
Despite strong external pressure, Norway has underlined the need to manage 
also marine mammals from an ecosystem perspective, where harvesting of seals 
and minke whales should be carried out in a sustainable manner. Subsidization 
of seal harvesting (and to some degree whaling) has been defended from the eco-
nomic perspective of competition between marine mammals and the fishing in-
dustry for commercially valuable prey such as cod.28
For decades it has been known that harvesting less of the immature cod is 
beneficial to the stock. This is one of the reasons behind the agreement of Russian 
access to Norwegian waters, as Russian waters have greater prevalence of juvenile 
NEA cod than Norwegian waters. The two countries also collaborate with regards 
to technical measures, such as minimum mesh and fish size, as well as sorting 
grids for trawling.
25. JNRFC 1997, 1999: 2.
26. Anon 1999: 25.
27. JNRFC 2003: 4.
28. Anon 2009b: 8; Flaaten 1988.
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After an initial aim of constant TAC, the JNRFC agreed to implement a harvest 
control rule (HCR) from 2004.29 This HCR estimates TAC for the three following 
years based on Fpa. Each year the TAC is updated similarly for the three following 
years based on a stochastic projection model (PROST). However, TAC is not usu-
ally allowed to change more than +/-10 % compared to the previous year. If the SSB 
falls below the precautionary approach level (Bpa), the TAC is reduced according 
to a linear measure between Fpa and F=0 for the SSB=0.30
By 2008 the NEA cod stock was considered to be in such good condition that the 
restrictions on TAC increases in the HCR were disregarded.31 In 2009, in light of 
the strong NEA cod stock, the JRNFC decided that there was a need to set criteria 
that ensure a minimum fishing mortality of 0.3.32
The implementation of port state control (PSC) in the Northeast Arctic Fisheries 
Commission (NEAFC) area since 2007 is believed to have had a positive effect on 
IUU fishing of NEA cod33. Before landing, vessels must send notice to the port 
state, who notifies the fishing vessel’s flag state in order to verify legality of catch, 
and the subtraction from the vessel’s allocated quotas. Furthermore, a significant 
percentage of the landings are to be inspected. Blacklisted vessels are not permit-
ted to call at ports of the NEAFC member states.
As mentioned earlier, monitoring and control is carried out by three entities, the 
Coast Guard, the Directorate of Fisheries and the sales organizations. The Coast 
Guard carries out control at sea through inspections of catches and fishing gear 
and the checking of logbooks, while the sales organizations control landings and 
thereby quotas. The Directorate of Fisheries controls both on land and at sea, via 
fisheries inspections and surveillance on the fishing grounds, satellite surveillance 
(VMS), quayside control of logbooks, as well as sales control. Sealing vessels have 
on-board observers reporting to the directorate.
An overview of the rebuilding measures is given in Table 1.
29. JNRFC 2002: 2.
30. JNRFC 2007: 3.
31. JNRFC 2008: 3.
32. JNRFC 2009: 3.
33. ICES 2010.
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Table 1: Overview of rebuilding measures
Type of measures Rebuilding measures
Output controls
– TAC (previously coastal vessels were allowed to continue har-
vesting even after the national TAC was fished)
– Group quotas
– IVQs
Input controls
– Vessel licenses
– Annual permits
– Decommissioning
Economic Incentives
– Reduced price subsidies
– Transferable rights
– Subsidies for marine mammal harvesting
– Subsidies for raw fish transportation
– Taxes and fees (cost recovery, decommissioning, tax, etc.)
Technical measures
– Increased minimum mesh size
– Increased minimum fish size
– Sorting grid for increased trawl selectivity
– Closed areas with high young fish by-catch
– Trawl closure areas
We evaluate the NEA cod fisheries rebuilding process based on the stated bio-
logical, economic and social goals. The development of the NEA cod stock, and 
especially the SSB (see Figure 5 and Figure 6), as well as the economic situation in 
the fleet (see Figure 8), show a degree of success. In the last nine years, the fishing 
mortality has been well within the limit set, and the same for SSB since 2003 (see 
Figure 5 and Figure 6). This is achieved with relatively high total landings in this 
time period (see Figure 7), and as seen in Figure 8, the average operating margin 
has been positive after 2003, though fluctuating. That said, it must be added that 
the environmental conditions, such as temperature and maturation changes, have 
been advantageous in these latter years, assisting the positive biological develop-
ment. It still remains to be seen whether the management will secure stability over 
time, both ecologically and economically.
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Figure 5: Fishing mortality (MeanF), ﬁshing mortality target (Fpa) and ﬁshing mortality 
limit (Flim), 1980–2011
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34. Data from ICES 2012a.
35. Data from ICES 2012a.
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Figure 7: Total NEA cod landings in tons, 1980–2011. Landings include unreported landings36
6. Results
6.1 Economic Aspects
As stated above, the Norwegian NEA cod fisheries are in part a transferable quota 
system. The conditionality of transferability results in a less than economically op-
timal distribution of quotas, i.e. fewer limitations regarding transferability would 
increase the economic rent in the fishery. Since Norwegian fisheries policy consists 
of social goals as well as economic ones, the current management can be seen to 
be more in line with a multi-criteria optimization, as a broader set of sometimes 
conflicting objectives may modify the findings regarding the optimality of trans-
ferability based on simplified and idealized situations.37 Hence there may be a 
trade-off between larger economic rents and other societal goals, such as securing 
viable coastal communities or a diverse fishing fleet.
Several indicators could be employed for the economic analysis of the fishery. The 
indicator most commonly used in the profitability analysis of Norwegian fishing 
vessels is Operating Margin (OM). OM measures the operating profit or Earnings 
before Interest and Tax (EBIT) in percent of total revenue. The necessary data 
needed to calculate this indicator is generally easily accessible in official statistics. 
36. Data from ICES 2012a.
37. Flaaten 2010.
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The operating margin gives a good picture of the profitability of an industry over 
time, but has not been a yardstick for policy makers as such.
In Figure 8 we observe the operating margin in demersal fisheries (where the 
NEA cod fisheries are the largest part) since 1980. The two years where the operat-
ing margin is negative, are the two crisis years of the fisheries, the former caused 
by stock decline and the latter by price decline. However, the average operating 
margin over the last 19 years has been greater than 6 %, which though not di-
rectly comparable is similar to non-financial mainland Norwegian companies.
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Figure 8: Operating margin (OM) and Return on Capital (ROC) (%) in Norwegian demer-
sal ﬁsheries (1980–2011).38
ROC numbers from 1994–1997 are for vessels 13m and larger, while 1998 –2011 encompass vessels 8m 
and larger, all from the Directorate of Fisheries.
The use of the OM indicator poses problems when comparing vessels groups. An 
alternative indicator is Return on Capital (ROC)39 or return on total assets em-
ployed, which measures earnings before tax plus financial costs in percent of the 
average capital employed. This indicator gives information on the profitability of a 
project compared to the opportunity cost of capital. The opportunity cost is a yard-
stick for policy makers as it states the return on capital in the best alternative use. 
In the Norwegian profitability studies carried out by the Directorate of Fisheries, 
38. Data from Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 2012c.
39. Also the ROC has its limitations, and alternative indicators are Return On Capital Employed 
(ROCE) and Return On Equity (ROE).
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the yield of government bonds has been used as the opportunity cost. In Figure 8 
we can therefore compare ROC with the OM indicator from 1990 onwards. The 
figure shows that the two indicators demonstrate the same trends.
ROC is useful for comparing the profitability between different projects, in our 
case different vessel groups. The main difference between OM and ROC is the 
fact that OM uses sales in the denominator, while ROC uses capital. If there were 
a constant relationship between sales and capital, both indicators would give the 
same ranking of the profitability of different vessel groups. That, however, is not the 
case. Furthermore, ROC makes differences in capital intensity more clear, which 
is the case between the two vessel groups that we present here.
A problem with ROC is the determination of the value of the total assets on the 
balance sheet or total capital employed. The book value is often underestimated 
compared to the true value of the assets. This is particularly true if the company 
has a tax incentive of using a depreciation plan that differs from the actual reduc-
tion in the value of the assets. A particular problem in analyzing the profitability of 
Norwegian vessels is how fishing rights are reported in the balance sheet. In many 
cases this value is not reported, but included in the vessel value (Flaaten et al 1995). 
From 2008 the Directorate of Fisheries has included certain fishing rights in the 
balance sheet. The fishing rights included are the time limited rights. Since 1994 
the Directorate of Fisheries has published ROC data, which are also presented in 
Figure 8. This gives an average ROC of 7,2 % for the period 1994–2011. It is natural 
to compare the fisheries to non-financial mainland Norwegian companies, where 
Statistics Norway presents data from 2007 to 2011. For this time period we find 
that the fishing vessels have an ROC of 6,1 % against the non-financial mainland 
companies’ average ROC of 8.4 %. This supports the findings of Steinshamn,40 that 
there is little or no resource rent present in the Norwegian cod fisheries.
From 2003 the Directorate of Fisheries not only published ROC for the whole 
fleet but also for coastal vessels (less than 28 meters) and ocean going vessels, 
separately. These numbers are presented in Figure 9.
40. Steinshamn 2005.
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Figure 9: ROC (in percent) for coastal vessels and ocean going vessels 2003–2011.30
Ocean going vessels include trawlers and offshore vessels using conventional fishing gear.
On average the coastal vessels have an ROC of 5.9 % compared to 5.0 % for the 
ocean going vessels. It is interesting to note that in the period 2003–2007 the 
coastal vessels had a higher ROC each year, but from 2008–2011 the ocean going 
vessels had higher ROC each year, with the exception of 2009.
There has been a rapid and substantial restructuring of quota for cod fisheries. 
Within the three vessel groupings – trawlers, offshore and coastal conventional 
gear vessels – transferred quota is now 58.1 %, 57.1 % and 23.6 %, respectively, of 
the total quota base for cod. The substantially lower percentage for the latter ves-
sel group is explained by the fact that not all vessels in this group are allowed to 
transfer quota.
The total costs of fisheries management vary around 9 % of the catch value, 
depending on market values for fish and cost of services.41
In a model analyzing economic data from 2002 and average quotas from 1999–
2002, Steinshamn42 indicated that there was little or no resource rent present in 
Norwegian fisheries at that point in time. With no restrictions on transferability 
of quota, the resource rent potential in Norwegian fisheries was estimated to be 
around NOK 7 billion. As there has been a substantial reduction in the fleet since 
2002, the presence of resource rent in Norwegian fisheries today seems probable. 
However, it may be expected that to a large degree this resource rent is to be found, 
41. Anon 2010b.
42. Steinshamn 2005.
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partly invisible, in companies that have transferred quota and licenses between 
their own fishing vessels, or have sold such rights to other companies.43 There is 
currently no resource rent taxation in Norwegian fisheries, other than a partial 
cost recovery tax to cover control costs, of 0.2 % of gross catch value.
6.2 Social Aspects
Over the years the Norwegian coastal communities’ dependency on fisheries has 
declined, in part due to technological development. However, many communities 
still have strong fisheries interests. Hence the stakeholders in the rebuilding of the 
NEA cod stock are not just the fishers and the fishing industry, but also the coastal 
populace as a whole. This has led to broad interest in the management changes that 
have been carried out since 1990, and much controversy as well.
Norway has a strong tradition of stakeholder involvement through what has 
been coined a system of centralized consultation, where the ultimate author-
ity lies with the central government after a consultative process of hearings.44 
Furthermore, this Norwegian co-management structure with industry participa-
tion and consultation, to quite some extent has given user groups direct input into 
fisheries management.45 The Advisory Meeting for Fisheries Regulations, which 
replaced the Management Council (Reguleringsrådet) in 2006, has opened up for 
greater participation of a broader set of stakeholders, such as environmental NGOs 
and the Sami Parliament, in addition to the traditional user groups.
In Norway the central equity issues in the rebuilding of the fishery are con-
nected to geographical distribution and vessel group diversification. Furthermore 
there is a focus on resources belonging to the community, be that a community of 
fishers, coastal communities or the Norwegian populace as a whole. For instance 
there is a strong focus on transferability not resulting in concentration of quotas 
in one part of the country, or within one segment of the fleet. Hence sale of quo-
tas between counties or vessel groups is not permitted.46 Furthermore, the formal 
requirement that quotas (in excess of the basic quota connected to each vessel) 
fall back to the state after a set number of years, is meant to ensure that the fish 
resources remain in public possession. Despite the focus on distributional issues 
in the management, the transferability of quotas has indeed affected some com-
munities – there are winners and losers in quota consolidation. However, changes 
43. Flaaten et al. 1995: 354.
44. Mikalsen and Jentoft 2003.
45. Hersoug and Rånes 1997.
46. Despite formal rules against moving of quota vessels with licenses and permits from the North 
to the South, media reports indicate that such transfers are to some extent taking place.
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in quota ownership have also allowed the consolidation of specific quotas, e.g. pe-
lagic versus demersal quotas, allowing a greater degree of specialization. Clearly 
there has been increased concentration of quotas amongst fewer holders, but this 
has mainly been debated regarding the offshore fleet where the concentration has 
been most marked.
Though the decline in number of fishers has been most marked since the first 
management changes in the 1990s, the decline is by no means outstanding in this 
time period (see Figure 10), and reflects the general substitution of labor by capital 
in primary sector industries. According to a study carried out in 200847, 66 % of 
the fishers believed they would still be fishing in 5 years’ time, while almost 20 % 
expected to be retired by then. This may also explain why the study showed no 
great worry amongst fishers as regards recruiting crew for fishing. The attitudes to 
fishing were largely optimistic, with almost 80 % stating they would recommend 
fishing to others.48
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Figure 10: Number of ﬁshermen in Norway (full and part time), 1950–201149
The average age of fishers in Norway has increased, as Table 2 shows. The share 
of fishers under 30 years of age is almost halved, while the share of those over 50 
has increased more than 30 %. Between the age of 30 and 50, the share has stayed 
largely unchanged. Since 2009 there has been a small increase, +1 %, in fishers 
under 30 years of age. There has also been a small decline in fishers between the 
age of 30 and 50, with the same increase in fishers over 50 years of age.
47. Johnsen and Vik 2008.
48. It must be mentioned that the recent record TAC of cod has caused worry regarding market 
prices, as it is speculated that supply may swamp demand.
49. Data from Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 2012b.
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In 2009 the Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs put in place 
a total of 30 start-up grants, each the value of 250,000 NOK, and 10 annual par-
ticipation rights, in order to encourage recruitment of young fishers. The grants 
were allocated over a period of three years.50 The scheme is continued in 2013, 
with some revisions.
Table 2: Percentage of full-time ﬁshers in diﬀerent age groups for the years 1983 and 201151
1983 2011
<30 years of age 31.4 17.7
Between 30 and 50 years of age 39.2 40.8
>50 years of age 29.3 41.5
There have been a number of compensating mechanisms put in place to soften 
the effects of the restructuring of the fishing fleet. Decommissioning has al-
lowed fishers to retire from the fishery with a comfortable compensation pack-
age. Furthermore, the quota deductions, i.e. the reduction in the transferred quota 
which then is divided among all remaining vessels, has attempted to also improve 
the conditions for the fishers who are unable or who choose not to buy additional 
quota.
The decline in number of vessels along the Norwegian coast varies geographi-
cally. In Figure 11 we see how the West Coast and the northernmost counties are 
the hardest hit as regards the decline in active vessels, with the former having less 
than 70 % of their 2001 numbers. It should be noted that the largest number of 
vessels are found in the northernmost counties; hence a reduction of 20 % of the 
active vessels from 2001 to 2008 consists of more than 700 vessels in this case. The 
average size of vessels is significantly larger on the West coast than in Northern 
Norway.
50. Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs 2009.
51. Data from Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 2012d.
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Figure 11: Remaining active ﬁshing vessels in three Norwegian coastal regions in 2002–2011 
compared to numbers in 2001*52.
* The West Coast includes the following counties: Møre og Romsdal, Sogn og Fjordane and Hordaland. 
Northern Norway consists of the following counties: Nordland, Troms and Finnmark. The counties of 
Trøndelag are located in-between the other two regions.
In another attempt to rectify some distributional issues, the Ministry of Fisheries and 
Coastal Affairs opened for the first time in 2011 for additional quota allocated to con-
ventional gear fishers in the areas of coastal Sami, the Norwegian indigenous peoples.
7. Discussion
Fisheries management over the 20 years following one of the most severe crises in 
the NEA cod fisheries to date has led to a number of lessons learned. These can be 
divided into management, legitimacy, and economic issues.
Regarding management, an important asset has been long-term collaboration 
on a transnational level, both through the JNRFC and NEAFC, ensuring beneficial 
coope rative forward planning. The institutionalization of a number of collabora-
tive measures within research and management has played in important role with 
regards to long-term goals for transboundary fish resources such as the NEA cod 
stock,53 and clearly has applicability to other transboundary or straddling stock 
fisheries.
52. Data from Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 2012e.
53. Jakobsen and Ozhigin 2011.
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Furthermore, management in the form of harvest control rules has allowed 
tradeoffs between long-term stability, and flexibility under changing circumstanc-
es. Despite management focus on long-term stability for its beneficial industry 
effects, the clear need for rapid change of tactics due to biological or market-
based variations has also been incorporated, and become an important aspect of 
Norwegian fisheries management.
The rebuilding of the NEA cod fisheries has been an ongoing learning process for 
the managers, and no one expects the future to be any different. Many permanent 
management institutions have been put in place, but other institutions require ongo-
ing adjustment and fine-tuning. For instance, technological advances will presum-
ably force changes in the limits as regards the number of quotas that can be gath-
ered on one vessel. Thinning quota markets within geographical limits can also be 
expected to force change, for example through grey and illegal markets for quotas, 
licenses and permits. These aspects will demand adaptive measures in the future.
A central legitimacy issue is the development and maintenance of political sup-
port and avoidance of stakeholder opposition. There are marked differences in the 
perceptions of how successful the management of fisheries has been in Norway 
over the last 20 years. Within the industry, and especially within the groups that 
have attained quota rights, there is largely an appreciation of the system, and the 
optimism in the fishery is reflected in the willingness to invest. However, outside 
the fishing industry there are negative feelings as a result of the societal conse-
quences of the restructuring of the fishing fleet. The concentration of fishing rights 
is seen as a threat to the many small coastal communities that historically have 
depended on fisheries. The concentration of rights on fewer vessels and vessel own-
ers has been criticized by parts of the land-based industry,
Though the above-mentioned concentration of rights is by no means without 
contention, the security of rights to individual rights holders has played an impor-
tant role in the general optimism in Norwegian fisheries. Furthermore, stable allo-
cation keys within the different vessel segments have secured vessel groups’ stable 
harvest expectations. In an industry where uncertainty traditionally was linked to 
policy, markets, and natural resources, the increased stability of the former and 
the latter as well, has enabled more long-term planning than previously possible.
Broad consultation and adoption of stakeholder preferences in policies have been 
important mechanisms for development and maintenance of support for policy 
initiatives. Evaluations of both new and implemented policies carried out by gov-
ernmentally-appointed committees or the ministry itself, have also played a role.
The increased focus on securing profitability in the fishery has improved the 
economic situation via the reduction in the number of vessels operating. It has 
ensured that Norwegian fisheries now have no need for subsidies, excluding man-
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agement costs paid by the general governmental budget, and the fishing fleet self-
adjusts effort through conditional quota transferability in order to meet the con-
tinuous technological development in the harvesting of fish. The geographical 
limitations in transferability have, however, led to some small markets for rights. 
This has resulted in fishers moving physically to access a better quota market, or 
just formally by registration of fictitious moves. The latter type of action circum-
vents regional policy goals and is considered illegal.
There are clear tradeoffs between economic efficiency and other societal goals, 
as reflected in the potential for resource rent creation.54 In Norwegian politics 
there is a willingness to pay for securing the viability of many communities and 
people along the long coastline.
The rent creation through the increased efficiency in the harvesting of cod and 
other species is partly invisible and can be found within companies or with indi-
viduals that have transferred quota and licenses between their fishing vessels, or 
have sold such rights to others. The fact that the resource rent is not taxed in excess 
of normal taxation therefore opens for the amassing of wealth among a few. This 
is perceived by some as the central legitimacy problem within Norwegian fisheries 
today. From the authorities the lack of resource rent taxation has been played off 
as securing that the coastal communities reap the benefits of the fisheries. It has 
also been a way of garnering acceptance amongst fishers for the transferability of 
quota rights. On a broader national scale, however, fisheries are not afforded much 
attention, and hence these legitimacy issues are of concern only to a limited sec-
tion of the population.
Availability of data has been important both on the biological and social side of 
fishery management. The NEA cod stock is one of the most data-rich fish stocks 
in the world, and fisheries data is also extensively available. Economic data in 
Norwegian fisheries is also highly developed due to collection initiated in connec-
tion with the subsidy regimes in the 1970s and 80s. This wealth of data has made 
it possible to argue comprehensively both with regards to the need to manage the 
stock and the effort in the fishery. This data has also contributed to the broader 
sets of management initiatives where there are tradeoffs between different fisher-
ies, e.g. the subsidization of sealing due to negative effects of large seal stocks, the 
reduction in by-catch of juvenile cod in shrimp fisheries, as well as the interest in 
keeping a large capelin stock as feed for the more lucrative cod stock.
Lessons learned that may be of value for other fisheries include the importance 
of cooperation, both nationally and internationally, the focus on efficiency meas-
ures calibrated to take into account legitimacy issues, as well as long-term biologi-
54. Leung et al. 2001.
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cal aims, coupled with flexibility in relation to changing circumstances, be they 
ecological, social, or economic.
Fisheries management in Norway is perceived as a permanent learning process, 
where the current management of the NEA cod stock has by no means seen its final 
state. Technological progress and continual environmental and market changes 
demand flexible and adjusted management actions. Public preferences may also be 
expected to change how fisheries management is carried out in the future, clearly 
indicating that this is not the last chapter in the story of the Norwegian NEA cod 
fisheries.
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